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Marksmanship, officer-man relations and 
the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield 
 
Abstract: This aƌtiĐle eǆaŵiŶes the Bƌitish AƌŵǇ͛s 
decision to adopt the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield 
(SMLE) in 1903. Historians invariably assume that this 
weapon was developed in response to demands to 
modernise and improve the Army following the failures 
and poor marksmanship of British soldiers fighting in 
the Boeƌ Waƌ. UŶdeƌstood this ǁaǇ the “MLE͛s 
selection appears inevitable and as a result is rarely 
examined in close detail. This stands in contrast to the 
wealth of attention dedicated to exploring how the 
cavalry fought to hold onto the arme blanche despite 
the apparent revolution in machinegun and artillery 
firepower. Upon closer examination, however, neither 
way of thinking about the changes occurring to the 
British Army after the Boer War does justice to the 
complexities surrounding the development and 
selection of the SMLE. Rather, by considering the 
manner in which different communities within the 
Army thought about battle, and in particular how 
engagements on the North West Frontier shaped 
perspectives on marksmanship, this article 
demonstrates how the Cavalry and the Indian Army 
played an important part in the adoption of the SMLE. 
 
Keywords: Revolution in Military Affairs, Tactics, Military Technology, British Army, 
Technological Determinism 
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Marksmanship, officer-man relations and the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield 
If the triumph at Omdurman in September 1898 symbolises the apotheosis of 
ĐoloŶial ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg, theŶ ͚BlaĐk Week͛ iŶ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϭϴϵϵ ŵust ƌepƌeseŶt its Ŷadiƌ. 
Within the space of sixteen months the British Army had experienced unparalleled 
victory and humiliating defeat. In the Sudan 11,000 Dervishes had been killed for the 
loss of just 48 men.1 By contrast in South Africa, Boer armies had won three 
significant battles at Stormberg, Magersfontein and ColeŶso. This stopped BƌitaiŶ͛s 
commander, Sir Redvers Buller, from orchestrating the relief of the sieges at 
Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith but also prompted a national outcry and 
ultimately his replacement in January 1900.2 
 
Omdurman had shown that the traditional approach to fire tactics, built around 
close order formations and fire by rank and volley, still had a place in the drill book. 
Less than two years later, the Boers had demonstrated how, through the 
employment of open order tactics, skirmishing and independent fire, a more radical 
vision of battle might operate.3 In the process, the Boers appeared to vindicate the 
loŶg held philosophies of the Bƌitish AƌŵǇ͛s ‘ifle ‘egiŵeŶts, philosophies that had 
framed the technical changes that brought about the introduction of the Lee-
Metford (LEME) in 1888.4  
 
The introduction of the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) was not, however, the 
result of the continued efforts of those in the Rifle Regiments. Rather, and as this 
essay will show, a number of new voices had emerged in the time between the 
adoptioŶ of the LEME aŶd the AƌŵǇ͛s iŶǀestigatioŶs iŶto the seleĐtioŶ of the “MLE. 
Taking a cue from the work by Stephen Badsey, Spencer Jones and a number of 
others, this paper examines how attitudes towards marksmanship, tactics and 
                                                     
1 E. Spiers, 'The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1914' ed. D. Chandler and I. Beckett, The 
Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford, 2003), pp. 206-209. 
2 Spiers, p. 200. 
3 S. Jones, '"The Shooting of the Boers was Extraordinary": British views of Boer 
marksmanship in the Second Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902' ed. K. Jones, G. Macola 
and D. Welch, A Cultural History of Firearms in the Age of Empires (Farnham, 2013). 
4 M. Ford, 'Towards a Revolution in Firepower? Logistics, Lethality, and the Lee-
Metford', War in History, 20 (2013), pp. 273-99. 
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officer-man relations changed as various military constituencies used the 
development of new rifle technology to frame their battles for institutional survival 
and organisational power.5 In the process, what emerges is the way in which the 
battlefield assumptions that underpinned a traditional approach to rifle usage were 
challenged and no longer deemed relevant. 
 
By exploring the views of three distinct groups with an interest in rifle technology – 
identified here as the Indians, the Cavalry and the Sceptics – this paper considers the 
underlying reasons behind changes to equipment and training that resulted in the 
SMLE. What becomes clear is that the pace of transformation, both in terms of 
technology and technique, had more to do with the appointment in 1900 of the 
former Indian Army commander, Field Marshal Lord Roberts, to the position of 
Commander-in-Chief. This reflected the fact that it was not in Africa that the British 
AƌŵǇ͛s heaǀǇ iŶfaŶtƌǇ fiƌst leaƌŶt that opeŶ oƌdeƌ taĐtiĐs, skirmishing and 
independent fire were a necessary adjunct to survival on the empty battlefield but 
rather on the North West Frontier. At the same time the Boer War cemented a 
consensus at least in relation to small-arms and fire tactics that had not previously 
been easy to come by in the 1880s.6 In particular, and as will become clear, the 
Cavalry were extremely keen to support the development of the SMLE, primarily 
because a number of features of the new weapon would help to ensure their 
continued survival in the face of those who advocated firepower over the arme 
blanche. 
 
The Indians 
Made up of officers who had served either within the Indian Army or as part of a 
British unit posted to defend India, the Indians were united by their belief in 
marksmanship skills, independent fire and open order formations. For a long time 
the Indians had been involved in politicking with Wolseley and Cambridge both in 
                                                     
5 S. Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 1880-1918 (Aldershot, 2008), 
Jones, From Boer War to World War - tactical reform of the British Army 1902-1914 
(Norman, 2012). 
6 Ford, pp. 273-99. 
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relation to key War Office appointments and also with regards to the distribution of 
limited resources and arguments over the importance of India versus the rest of 
Empire.7 However, whereas the LEME had generated a significant argument within 
the War Office the Indians had not been consulted at all. This reflected the fact that 
the Indian and British armies were separate institutions but it was also that many at 
the War Office were suspicious of the Sepoy army following the Mutiny of 1857.8 
After the initial defeats of the Boer War, this situation reversed and Field Marshal 
Lord Roberts, the former Indian Army Commander-in-Chief and his protégé Colonel 
Ian Hamilton (eventually knighted in 1900 and made full General in 1907) became 
instrumental in the selection of a new rifle. 
 
Lord Roberts originally joined the Bengal Artillery in 1851, serving with distinction 
duƌiŶg the ͚IŶdiaŶ MutiŶǇ͛ of ϭϴϱϳ ǁheŶ he ǁoŶ the VC aŶd ƋuiĐklǇ ƌose to ColoŶel 
and Quarter-Master General in 1876.9 Having become a full Major-General in 1878, 
Roberts established his military reputation beyond any doubt when he force 
marched 10,000 men the 312 miles from Kabul to relieve the siege of Kandahar 
during the Second Afghan War of 1878-1880.10 In November 1881 he became 
Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army and was promoted to Lieutenant-General 
in 1883. A keen shot, Roberts backed the South India Rifle Association and organised 
his staff into a shooting team.11 By 1885 Roberts was Commander-in-Chief of all 
British forces in India making full General in 1890.12 In 1893 he returned to England 
without a posting where it seemed he might be forced to seek early retirement. 
With the departure of the Duke of Cambridge and the appointment of Lord Wolseley 
to Commander-in-Chief in 1895, Roberts was saved from this possibility and 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of IƌelaŶd. FolloǁiŶg ͚BlaĐk Week͛, ‘oďeƌts ƌeplaĐed 
                                                     
7 T. Packenham, The Boer War (London, 1979), pp. 73-73; A. Preston, 'Wolseley, the 
Khartoum Relief Expedition and the Defence of India, 1885-1900', The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 6 (1978), pp. 269-270. 
8 H. Kochanski, Sir Garnet Wolseley: Victorian Hero (London, 1999), p. 222. 
9 A. Wessels, Lord Roberts and the War in South Africa, 1899-1902, (London, 2000), 
p. xiv. 
10 Wessels, p. xiv. 
11 D. James, The Life of Lord Roberts (London, 1954), p. 191. 
12 Wessels, p. xv. 
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General Buller and took command in South Africa. By November 1900, having 
occupied Bloemfontein and Pretoria, the capitals of the Boer Republics, he returned 
to Britain to take up the position of Commander-in-Chief. 
 
Roberts was very keen to improve the standard of rifle shooting within the Indian 
Army.13 To this end he appointed Ian Hamilton to be Assistant Adjutant-General of 
Musketry at the Madras Army Headquarters in the spring of 1882.14 After attending 
the School of Musketry at Hythe, Hamilton worked studiously to improve the skills of 
his regiment, the Gordon Highlanders. Training his regiment to shoot was not, 
however, what attracted the attention of the Lord Roberts. Rather, Hamilton first 
came to the notice of Roberts during the Second Afghan War where he 
demonstrated courage in retaking a picket after it had been abandoned by some 
British troops.15 Known as a brave officer and to have served with distinction in India 
and during the First Boer War of 1881, Hamilton reinvigorated musketry drill in India. 
 
This was achieved in a number of ways. Firstly, Hamilton set about completely re-
ǁƌitiŶg the IŶdiaŶ AƌŵǇ͛s ŵusketƌǇ ƌegulatioŶs. TheŶ haǀiŶg ŵade seǀeƌal ĐhaŶges 
to the layout of the four rifle ranges in India he ensured that Indian Army officers 
and men could for the first time take advantage of the facilities to practise 
shooting.16 MusketƌǇ tƌaiŶiŶg ǁas Ŷo loŶgeƌ siŵplǇ aďout stƌikiŶg a ďull͛s eǇe at 
certain distances but also involved higher instruction on hitting moving objects such 
as the running deer or targets that sprung up from the ground. All conceived of in 
the first instance by Hamilton, the drill book and butts now reflected what he 
considered to be the most important aspects of rifle shooting: individual initiative 
and marksmanship.17 These ideas were further expounded in his 1885 book The 
Fighting of the Future ǁheƌe HaŵiltoŶ aƌgued that, ͚…the paƌaŵouŶt desideƌatuŵ iŶ 
                                                     
13 James. p. 191-192. 
14 J. Lee, A Soldier's Life - General Sir Ian Hamilton, 1853-1947 (London, 2000), p. 19. 
15 Lee, p. 12. 
16 ͚MusketƌǇ aŶd Field-FiƌiŶg͛, Pioneer, February 15th 1890, Hamilton Papers 17/2, 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA). 
17 Lee, p.19. 
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a fightiŶg ŵaŶ is, that he should shoot iŶtelligeŶtlǇ aŶd ǁell…͛.18 Later in life when 
questioned about his experiences during the Second Boer War it would become 
Đleaƌ that HaŵiltoŶ͛s ǀieǁs oŶ ŵaƌksŵaŶship had haƌdlǇ ĐhaŶged thƌoughout his 
career.19 That aside, what was apparent in the 1880s was that Hamilton had the full 
support of Roberts. With so much importance being attached to it by such a senior 
ĐoŵŵaŶdeƌ theƌe Đould ďe Ŷo douďt that the IŶdiaŶ AƌŵǇ͛s skill at aƌŵs ǁould haǀe 
to improve. What would prove to be annoying for the likes of Wolseley and 
Cambridge at the War Office was that, despite initially rejecting the proposal, they 
were forced into adopting the Indian system of musketry training in order to ensure 
that British units kept up.20 The real British school of musketry, one Indian paper 
ĐoŵŵeŶted, ͚…is at “iŵla aŶd Ŷot HǇthe͛.21 
 
Nevertheless, competition between the British and Indian armies was not the main 
ƌeasoŶ foƌ ‘oďeƌts͛ iŶteƌest iŶ ŵusketƌǇ tƌaiŶiŶg. ‘atheƌ his ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ǁeƌe 
motivated by the problem of defending the difficult mountainous terrain on the 
North West Frontier.22 Stimulated by the possibility that the Russians might use the 
ĐouŶtƌǇ as a stagiŶg post foƌ the oǀeƌlaŶd iŶǀasioŶ of IŶdia, BƌitaiŶ͛s iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ 
Afghanistan was limited to preventing invasion and keeping the restive Pathan tribes 
from attacking the Punjab. This was not achieved simply by manning fixed 
fortifications but by regular patrols to gather intelligence and suppress tribal factions 
and by buying the support of key tribesmen through trade and bribery. 23 
Occasionally, a major expedition had to be organised in order to assert British 
interests in the region and it was invariably whilst undertaking these activities that 
the traditional approach to drill came under close scrutiny. The fact of the matter 
                                                     
18 I. Hamilton, The Fighting of the Future (London, 1885), p. 14. 
19 Evidence given by Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton to the Royal Commission of 
the War in South Africa (RCWSA), 12th February 1903, Vol. 2 Minutes of Evidence, p. 
112, RCWSA. 
20 Lee, p. 20. 
21 ͚MusketƌǇ iŶ IŶdia͛, Broad Arrow, 16th July 1892, Hamilton Papers, 17/3/2, LHCMA. 
22 For further detail conditions found on the North West Frontier see T. Moreman, 
The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947 (Basingstoke, 
1998), pp. 1-4. 
23 Moreman, p. 5. 
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was that hill fighting required a fundamentally different set of tactical skills from 
those used by heavy line infantry. 
 
Compared to colonial campaigning in other parts of the Empire, Afghans fought with 
a skill that was unmatched. Occasionally the Pathans would launch sword-wielding 
charges that could easily be repelled by volley fire. More fruitful tactics involved 
taking advantage of the terrain and shooting their enemies from behind cover.24 In 
these circumstances close order formation and volley fire were a lethal combination: 
not for Afghans but rather for those British battalions which utilised such tactics. This 
was because standing in the open, shoulder to shoulder, made for an easy target for 
Pathan sharpshooters. Afghans could use the time between each volley to bob up 
from behind a rock to pick off individual soldiers. Winston Churchill noted that, 
͚tƌiďesŵeŶ… daƌt fƌoŵ ƌoĐk to ƌoĐk… ďefoƌe the atteŶtioŶ of a seĐtioŶ Đould ďe 
diƌeĐted to theŵ aŶd the ƌifles aiŵed… the taƌget ǁould haǀe ǀaŶished…͛.25 Wearing 
distinctive dress, responsible for command and control and orchestrating the fire of 
their men, officers were particularly vulnerable to this kind of fire.26 At the same 
time the LEME rifles available to British infantrymen were not light enough to 
facilitate snap shooting at moving targets that were often at higher elevations. As a 
result the technology had the potential to reinforce a tactical approach 
inappropriate for the terrain, a situation that was to come to a head during the Tirah 
Campaign of 1897-98 where the traditional approach of firing by line and rank in 
volleys was put to the test.27 
 
Compared to other campaigns on the North West Frontier, the Tirah saw the British 
and Indian Armies facing an enemy armed with a high proportion of breech-loading 
and long range rifles.28 While the Pathans had been armed with muzzle-loading 
                                                     
24 Moreman, pp. 12-13 and p. 63. On Pashtun tribal tactics see R. Johnson, The 
Afghan Way of War - culture and pragmatism: a critical history (London, 2011). 
25 W. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (London, 1899),p. 285. 
26 Churchill., p. 289. 
27 N. Evans, From Drill to Doctrine: forging the British Army's tactics, 1897-1909, 
(PhD, King's College London, London, 2007), pp. 27-71. 
28 Evans, pp. 34-35. 
 - 8 - 
muskets and home-made rifles the level of threat could be countered without 
restricting speed of manoeuvre. However, as the tribesmen acquired rifled weapons 
with modern ammunition British commanders were compelled to throw out pickets 
on hilltops along the line of advance.29 This helped to protect the main column but 
restricted movement. Given the large distances the Army needed to traverse in 
order to suppress revolt this could severely limit operations. 
 
Bearing in mind the reforms put in place by Roberts and Hamilton, Indian Army 
units, especially when recruited from mountainous regions, were in a better position 
to face the onslaught. British battalions, by contrast, suffered, partly because of the 
way in which some were wedded to the drill book and unwilling to learn from their 
more experienced Indian counterparts.30 With close order volley fire likely to result 
in unnecessary casualties, the tactics most appropriate for mountain warfare 
included skirmishing skills such as the use of open order formation, independent fire, 
stalking and field craft.31 As these tactics could not be controlled by word of 
battalion commanders, officers and men had to be more self-reliant and willing to 
use their initiative when confronting unplanned situations. Despite their best efforts, 
however, the Native Army was often let down by the standard of their equipment. 
Armed with the Martini-Henry, a weapon which still utilised black powder 
ammunition, tactical achievements could be undone and positions given away when 
troops fired their first shot.32 But technology aside, the Indian Army was in many 
ways better prepared for warfare in the hills compared with their counterparts in the 
British Army. 
 
                                                     
29 “ee the T. MoƌeŵaŶ, ͚The AƌŵǇ iŶ IŶdia & FƌoŶtieƌ Waƌfaƌe ϭϵϭϰ-ϭϵϯϵ͛, fouŶd at 
http://www.king-emperor.com/Frontier%20Warfare%201914-1939.html, site visited 
on 1st June 2014. This also prompted British Imperial authorities to work harder at 
controlling the supply of weapons to the Afghan tribes. See S. Ball, 'The Battle of 
Dubai: firearms on Britain's Arabian frontier, 1906-1915' ed. K. Jones, G. Macola and 
D. Welch, A Cultural History of Firearms in the Age of Empires (Farnham, 2013). 
30 Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-
1947, pp. 71-72. 
31 Moreman, pp. 13-24. 
32 Evans, p. 46. 
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Given the casualties that occurred in the first year of the campaign, the Tirah 
expedition caused a considerable shock within the British and Indian military 
establishment.33 The response of the Indian Army was to cement an already familiar 
approach to low level initiative and small unit tactics by issuing a new manual in 
1900 called Mountain Warfare. The reaction from the War Office was to appoint Ian 
Hamilton to become Commandant of the School of Musketry at Hythe. Accidental 
injury had prevented Hamilton from serving with any distinction in the Tirah.34 
However, his enthusiasm for musketry made him a natural choice for General Sir 
EǀelǇŶ Wood, the Bƌitish AƌŵǇ͛s AdjutaŶt-General.35 Having taken this new post, 
Hamilton was in a position to do for the British Army what he had tried to achieve 
for the Indian Army. At the same time, in terms of the SMLE story, the appointment 
was crucial for it ensured that an Indian was well placed to express their views on 
matters relating to small-arms. This was to prove important in 1898 when a small-
arms committee was established by Field Marshal Wolseley to look at whether the 
LEME ought to be replaced.36 
 
The idea of ĐhaŶgiŶg the iŶfaŶtƌǇ͛s ƌifle foƌ a shoƌteƌ ǁeapoŶ had fiƌst suƌfaĐed iŶ 
December 1895 when Lieutenant Colonel N. Lockyer, the Chief Inspector of Small-
arms (CISA), had suggested that the entire Army should use carbines.37 Carbines had 
short barrels and were usually issued to cavalry and artillery units that needed 
personal firearms but whose main role did not involve the use of small-arms fire. 
This could put these units at a disadvantage if they were forced to take on infantry in 
uŶfaǀouƌaďle ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes. This ǁas ďeĐause the ĐaƌďiŶe͛s shoƌteƌ ďaƌƌel alloǁed 
the combustion energies created in the firing chamber to dissipate before they had 
been fully utilised to propel the bullet. Consequently, a typical carbine was effective 
out to a shorter range when compared to a rifle. On the other hand the LEME 
carbine which had been adopted in 1894 was 9½ inches shorter and weighed 1lb 
                                                     
33 Evans, p. 35. 
34 Lee, pp. 40-42. 
35 Lee, p. 43. 
36 Arnold Forster Papers, 50315, BL. 
37 Letteƌ eŶtitled ͚CaƌďiŶe iŶ Lieu of the ‘ifle͛ fƌoŵ CI“A to IGO, ϮϬth December 1895, 
SUPP 6-651, National Archive (TNA). 
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13oz less than the conventional weapon and was as a result considerably handier to 
use.38 It was therefore easier to pick up and aim: an important consideration when 
taking snap shots at moving targets. 
 
Nevertheless, while the carbine fired black powder ammunition it would be at a 
range disadvantage when compared to a rifle. However, during the early 1890s this 
situation began to change as a safe manufacturing process for cordite - the British 
design of smokeless propellant - was perfected. All other things being equal, the 
energy created by cordite was greater than that produced by black powder.39 As a 
result muzzle velocities could be increased and bullets propelled with a flatter 
trajectory. Smokeless powders consequently had a number of tactical advantages.40 
Flatter trajectories meant that soldiers had to make fewer compensatory 
adjustments to their aim, thereby making it easier to hit a target. This reduced 
aŵŵuŶitioŶ ǁastage. At the saŵe tiŵe, this Ŷeǁ aŵŵuŶitioŶ eŶsuƌed the shooteƌ͛s 
position was not revealed when he fired. This would not be such an important 
consideration when fighting against poorly armed foes like the Dervish, but when up 
against men armed with equivalent technology the empty battlefield phenomenon 
would be exacerbated. 
 
As Colonel Lockyer had observed these were not the only possible advantages to 
come from a change to cordite. Faster muzzle velocities also meant that weapons 
with shorter barrels such as the LEME carbine could achieve similar range and 
accuracy as LEME rifles.41 Although cordite propellant was subsequently adopted 
even for the LEME, Lord Wolseley was not in favour of adopting a carbine for the 
Army.42 Almost certainly this was because, he associated long barrelled rifles with 
increased range, which was more important to him than weapon handiness. Despite 
                                                     
38 Letteƌ eŶtitled ͚CaƌďiŶe iŶ Lieu of the ‘ifle͛ fƌoŵ CI“A to IGO, ϮϬth December 1895, 
SUPP 6-651, National Archive (TNA), Textbook of Small Arms (London, 1929), p. 7; 
see List of Changes, LC. 7751, RAA. 
39 E.G.B. Reynolds, The Lee-Enfield Rifle (London, 1960), p. 30. 
40 Reynolds, p. 30. 
41 ͚The EǀolutioŶ of “ŵall-aƌŵs͛, The Times, 1st July 1898. 
42 Arnold Forster Papers, 50315, BL. 
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having a more favourable view on open order formations than the Duke of 
Cambridge, it is likely that Wolseley still believed long range volley fire by rank and 
file had some battlefield utility when a beaten zone was needed to destroy a large 
body of advancing enemy in close order formation.43 
 
WolseleǇ͛s ƌejeĐtioŶ of LoĐkǇeƌ͛s suggestioŶs pƌeseŶted soŵe teĐhŶiĐal aŶd fiŶaŶĐial 
ĐhalleŶges. Coƌdite͛s iŶĐƌeased heat eŶĐouƌaged ǁeaƌ aŶd teaƌ espeĐiallǇ at the 
ďƌeeĐh eŶd of the LEME͛s ďaƌƌel.44 If costs were to be minimised and weapon 
efficiency maintained then a technical solution to the problem had to be found. The 
‘“AF͛s aŶsǁeƌ ǁas to deǀelop EŶfield ƌifliŶg foƌ the LEME.45 This prolonged the life 
of the barrel and led to the introduction of the long Lee-Enfield rifle and its carbine 
equivalents in 1896 and 1898 respectively.46 The decision to adopt the Lee-Enfield 
was therefore most probably a by-pƌoduĐt of WolseleǇ͛s ǀieǁs oŶ the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of 
long range fire. But LoĐkǇeƌ͛s ŵeŵo also ƌaised the possiďilitǇ of a lighteƌ ƌifle. If 
suĐh a thiŶg ǁas possiďle ǁithout saĐƌifiĐiŶg WolseleǇ͛s ƌaŶge ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts theŶ the 
Army might abandon both the LEME and the Lee-Enfield sooner than later. 
Accordingly in 1898 Wolseley, whilst Commander-in-Chief, directed that further 
investigations be undertaken into a new rifle for the Army.47 
 
At this point that Ian Hamilton entered the picture. With his arrival at Hythe, 
Hamilton was in the perfect place to influence the design of small-arms based on his 
experience of fighting on the North West Frontier.48 Hamilton was chairman of a 
new Small-arms Committee made up of three men, one of whom included the CISA, 
Colonel Lockyer. Charged with investigating whether a new lighter rifle should be 
introduced the committee drew up a short list of weapons for consideration and 
further examination. By April 1899, having examined four possible firearms including 
                                                     
43  WolseleǇ͛s ǀieǁs oŶ this ĐaŶ ďe fouŶd iŶ C.C. Brackenbury, 'The Latest 
Development of the Tactics of the Three Arms', JRUSI, 27 (1884), p. 482. 
44 Reynolds, p. 30. 
45 i.e. a change in the pattern of grooves within the barrel of the rifle from Metford 
to Enfield design., Reynolds. p. 37. 
46 See List of Changes, LC. 8196 and LC. 8390, RAA. 
47 Arnold Forster Papers, 50315, BL. 
48 Arnold Forster Papers, 50315, BL. 
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LoĐkǇeƌ͛s ĐaƌďiŶe aŶd a Ŷuŵďeƌ of ŵodified shoƌteŶed Lee-Enfield rifles, the 
committee made its recommendations.49 Lighter weapons were preferred because 
they would make it easier for the soldier to take a snap shot at a moving target. 
Achieving this without reducing the length of the rifle would be too difficult. 
Accordingly, the decision was taken to lighten the rifle by shortening its barrel, take 
advantage of cordite ammunition but avoid compromising on weapon range. In this 
ƌespeĐt LoĐkǇeƌ͛s ĐaƌďiŶe suggestioŶ ǁas ƌejeĐted ďeĐause its ďaƌƌel ǁas too shoƌt 
but one of the other modified Lee-Enfields appeared to provide a relatively simple 
solution to the weight problem and for this reason it was put forward by the 
committee.50 Unfortunately for the Indians, before the matter could be investigated 
further the Boer War had started. By the time the issue was considered again 
Wolseley had been replaced by Roberts and the Wolseley ring had collapsed.51 If 
Wolseley had been left in office long enough, there might have been more argument 
within the War Office over what would replace the LEME. As it was, events not only 
made it possible for the Indians to influence the design of small-arms in the first 
place but also ensured there would be little resistance to their views from other 
protagonists. This made the decision to abandon the LEME and Lee-Enfield easier to 
oƌĐhestƌate. With seǀeƌal iŵpoƌtaŶt ŵodifiĐatioŶs, the ǁeapoŶ that HaŵiltoŶ͛s 
committee recommended in 1899 would eventually become the SMLE in 1903. 
Before that ambition could be realised, however, circumstances would also have an 
impact on the Indians and their views on what should replace the LEME. 
 
The Boer War 1899-1902 
The Boer War proved to be extremely controversial for the British Army. Half a 
million British and colonial soldiers fought around 78,000 Boers over two and a half 
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years.52 The war progressed in several phases. In the first, the Boers staged a limited 
offensive that resulted in the sieges of Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith. In the 
seĐoŶd, Bulleƌ͛s ĐouŶteƌ-offensive was repelled leading to his replacement by Field 
Marshal Roberts. In the third, Roberts would launch successful attacks towards 
Bloemfontein and, before the end of 1900, occupy the capitals of the Orange Free 
State and the Transvaal. In the final phase, Roberts would return home to become 
Commander-in-Chief and Lord Kitchener would take the fight to the Boers who were 
ǁagiŶg a gueƌƌilla ĐaŵpaigŶ. IŶ teƌŵs of the “MLE stoƌǇ, Bulleƌ͛s defeat heƌalded the 
collapse of the Wolseley ring and ensured that the small-arms debate would change 
in favour of the Indians. However, the war also influenced the Indian view of tactics 
and small-arms technology and helped raise to prominence the second important 
interest group known here as the Cavalry School. This section is therefore concerned 
with how the Boer War affected technical decisions in relation to the SMLE. 
 
It is Ŷot easǇ to ŵake geŶeƌalisatioŶs aďout the Bƌitish AƌŵǇ͛s peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe duƌiŶg 
the war without being overly simplistic. Some units fought well, demonstrated an 
appreciation of the battlefield problems that they faced and used appropriate tactics 
to achieve victory. Others did not. At Elandslaagt in 1899, for example, Ian Hamilton 
organised a successful attack on Boer positions that involved infantry in open order 
formation, a flanking manoeuvre and cavalry.53 On the other hand Major-General 
Hart at Colenso demonstrated the error of traditional Aldershot tactics when he 
marched the Irish Brigade in close order up to the Boer lines only to get severely 
ŵauled ďǇ a hiddeŶ eŶeŵǇ fiƌiŶg sŵokeless .Ϯϳϲ͟ Mauseƌ aŵŵuŶitioŶ.54 
 
Veterans of the North West Frontier recognised the similarities between the way the 
Boers and Afghans fought. On the defensive the Boers could easily hide themselves 
along a geographical feature, firing on the British as targets revealed themselves, 
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knowing that their smokeless ammunition would not give them away.55 Excellent at 
marksmanship, their prowess with the rifle left an enduring impression on British 
troops.56 But when on the attack they could be reckless, especially when facing 
inexperienced or poor quality troops with poor marksmanship skills. As Hamilton 
observed, in these circumstances the Boers would be more than happy to ride their 
ponies close to British lines and shoot from horseback before riding away.57 
 
Within a month of arriving at Cape Town, Roberts issued several memoranda to all 
commanders providing explicit guidance on what tactics ought to be utilised in 
fighting in South Africa.58 This drew on his experience of war on the North West 
Frontier. This made it clear that open order was to be the Ŷoƌŵ aŶd, giǀeŶ the Boeƌs͛ 
tactics, banished the use of volley fire as standard battlefield practice. Roberts 
recognised that open order formations might cause command problems for 
battalion and company commanders unused to light infantry tactics and suggested 
the use of whistle commands as a stop-gap.59 The solution was hardly ideal but given 
the geŶeƌal leǀel of the AƌŵǇ͛s skiƌŵishiŶg skills theƌe ǁeƌe feǁ alteƌŶatiǀes 
available. 
 
At the same time Roberts appreciated that one way of increasing shooting prowess 
was to change the rifle in such a way as to make it more convenient, given battlefield 
conditions: to take away any technical encumbrances that might inhibit its use. Thus 
from the technology perspective, by November 1900 Roberts was telling the 
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Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, that he believed a new weapon along 
the lines recommended by Hamilton in 1899 ought to be further developed and 
adopted by the British Army as a whole.60  He even stated that it might be 
appropriate to look at sŵalleƌ Đaliďƌes thaŶ the .ϯϬϯ͟ ƌouŶd: the .Ϯϳϲ͟ Mauseƌ had 
clearly made an impact with all those who were on the receiving end of its fire. 
 
‘oďeƌts͛ ǀieǁ oŶ ĐhaŶgiŶg Đaliďƌe ǁas eǀeŶtuallǇ aďaŶdoŶed foƌ fiŶaŶĐial ƌeasoŶs.61 
Nevertheless, the fact that he was considering it provides some insight on his views 
of the battlefield. For, depending on the precise design, changing to a smaller calibre 
might also relieve some of the logistical constraints that affected the British Army. By 
decreasing the size of the round it would be possible to carry more ammunition in 
the supply chain without increasing the overall volume or weight of baggage 
transported. This was an attractive proposition because, as Lord Kitchener had 
observed, the men were invariably reluctant to fire independently without direction 
from officers.62 IŶ KitĐheŶeƌ͛s ŵiŶd the pƌoďleŵ ǁas Ŷot oǀeƌ-expenditure of 
ammunition caused by unsanctioned use of the magazine but rather encouraging the 
initiative of the soldier to open fire when presented with a viable target.63 It seemed 
that so much effort had been expended on drumming home the fact that the British 
Army fought at the end of a lengthy supply chain that it had been forgotten that one 
of the objectives of battle was to kill the enemy. 
 
One of the dƌiǀiŶg aŵďitioŶs ďehiŶd the IŶdiaŶs͛ deĐisioŶ to adopt the “MLE iŶ ϭϵϬϯ 
was, therefore, the need to encourage soldiers to make more independent use of 
their rifles to engage with targets of opportunity.64 This was not a new idea. On the 
basis of his experience in India, Hamilton had suggested as much in 1899. The Boer 
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War drove home the need for technical change in order to tighten up the 
relationship between the design of the rifle and the way it was to be used. Reducing 
its length and weight whilst removing the magazine cut-off was seen as a means by 
which a soldier might be encouraged to use his rifle when appropriate.65 Although 
the cut-off was eventually retained, mainly because of concerns expressed by native 
army commanders who valued the discipline of single-shot fire, the fact was that the 
Indians were keen to remove it.66  They saw the need to make it easier for the men 
to use their weapon as dictated by the needs of the battle.67 
 
At the same time, the number of rounds held in the magazine was increased from 
eight in the LEME to ten in the SMLE.68 This apparently minor change meant that 
troops could generate 25% more fire before having to reload. But it was the decision 
to provide a magazine charger that really made it possible to increase the rifle͛s ƌate 
of fire.69 Previously it had been necessary for the LEME to be reloaded one round at 
a time. This new device held five rounds and made it possible to quickly recharge the 
magazine. The cumulative effect of all these changes was to give soldiers more 
flexibility in the use of their weapon, allowing them to engage with targets at a 
speed appropriate for the engagement. Clearly the logistical concerns advanced by 
those with experience of Imperial campaigning like Wolseley were not so important 
to the Indians. Nor, it would seem, did they distrust the soldier in quite the same 
way as traditionalists like Cambridge. 
 
The enemy, both in India and South Africa, had adopted tactics of concealment 
based on their superior knowledge of the terrain and their mobility. This was 
compounded by the way in which smokeless powders made it considerably harder 
to identify their location. As far as the Indians were concerned a weapon that was 
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easy to reload, did not hinder movement and made it easier to bring up to the eye to 
aim by being both lighter and shorter only served to encourage its use against 
elusive targets. And in this respect the SMLE was a rifle that, for the first time, 
reflected the problems associated with the empty battlefield. In conjunction with 
ammunition that utilised cordite propellant, the weapon was designed to allow the 
soldier to engage the enemy quickly whilst remaining concealed. 
 
What the new technology would represent, however, was a changed set of social 
relations between an officer and his man. Soldiers would need to be trained to use 
their weapon independently and officers would have to rely on them to carry out 
their allotted tasks in accordance with the demands of commanders. This, in turn, 
implied that the right sort of man would need to be recruited to become a soldier 
before being given appropriate marksmanship training. This suggested a greater 
degree of professionalisation and a greater degree of emphasis on recruiting from 
the ͚ƌight͛ soĐial ďaĐkgƌouŶds. 70  No doubt these considerations partly explain 
HaŵiltoŶ͛s eŵphasis oŶ the ďeŶefits of ƌeĐƌuitiŶg fƌoŵ outside ŵajoƌ uƌďaŶ ĐeŶtƌes 
aŶd ‘oďeƌts͛ gƌeat iŶteƌest iŶ ĐultiǀatiŶg oƌgaŶisatioŶs like the “oĐietǇ of WoƌkiŶg 
MeŶ͛s ‘ifle Cluďs that Đould pƌoŵote aŶd soĐialise appƌopƌiate ĐitizeŶ ďehaviours 
even before someone might choose to join the Army. 
 
The Cavalry 
The CaǀalƌǇ͛s ďattlefield pƌoďleŵs aƌose as a ƌesult of the iŶĐƌeased aǀailaďilitǇ of 
sophisticated munitions technology that complicated the tactical picture. Smokeless 
propellants made it difficult to identify where the enemy was located.71 In Lord 
‘oďeƌts͛ opiŶioŶ these teĐhŶologiĐal deǀelopŵeŶts Đoŵpƌoŵised the ŵilitaƌǇ utilitǇ 
of the arme blanche. He noted that during the Boer War the cavalry had neither 
mounted an effective charge nor dismounted regularly enough to make use of their 
carbines.72 At Poplar Grove in March 1900, for instance, the Cavalry Division under 
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Major General John French failed to cut off a retreating Boer army. As far as Lord 
Roberts was concerned, then, the cavalry struggled to deliver the battle winning 
results some of its more vocal supporters suggested of it. 
 
That is not to say, however, that Cavalry enthusiasts like Sir John French or his chief 
of staff, Douglas Haig didŶ͛t ƌeĐogŶise the ǀalue of eŶgagiŶg the enemy with fire. On 
the contrary, and as Stephen Badsey has recently alluded, both officers understood 
the benefits of firepower, arguing even while they were in South Africa that the 
cavalry should have a comparable rifle to the infantry.73 What was important to 
them, however, was increasing the tactical utility of the cavalry without being re-
designated as Mounted Infantry. 74  Consequently, as a number of firepower 
advocates like Hamilton started to make the case for more Mounted Infantry, French 
and Haig started to harden their position on the role of the rifle as they sought to 
defend their position as a separate branch of the Army. In this context it was 
iŵpoƌtaŶt to eŵphasise the ĐaǀalƌǇ͛s distiŶĐtŶess ďǇ ƌetaiŶiŶg a ǁeapoŶ that FƌeŶĐh 
and Haig believed summed up the cavalry philosophy, a philosophy that emphasised 
élan, daring and a willingness to take risks.75 
 
Unfortunately for the likes of French and Haig who were still in South Africa, when 
Roberts returned home he was able to use his position to influence how the cavalry 
would be equipped in the future without facing significant opposition. Subsequently, 
and in contrast to the preferences of French and Haig, the Commander-in-Chief 
decided that the arme blanche should be secondary to the rifle. Even though the 
Cavalry enthusiasts were already talking about switching the mix of weaponry so as 
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to place more emphasis on the utility of the rifle, Roberts had moved to amend the 
armament of the cavalry. In the face of increasing friction with French and Haig, Lord 
‘oďeƌts ǁould eǀeŶtuallǇ haƌdeŶ his positioŶ iŶ the ϭϵϬϰ seƌǀiĐe ŵaŶual ͚Cavalry 
Training͛. Heƌe he ǁƌote aŶ iŶflaŵŵatoƌǇ pƌefaĐe ǁhiĐh stated his ǀieǁs ĐleaƌlǇ oŶ 
the role and usefulness of the cavalry and asked that, in the future, training reflect 
the nature of the firepower dominated battlefield.76 As far as he was concerned the 
cavalry ought to have first-rate rifles, not carbines, and emphasise the use of fire 
tactics in their training over the arme blanche.77 The lance was abolished except for 
ceremonial and policing duties whilst the sword would be retained but only as an 
adjunct to the rifle.78 In the future the rifle would be kept strapped to the man 
(rather than in a bucket on the horse) in case the man was separated from his 
mount.79 The trooper would as a result be ever ready for dismounted combat.80 At 
the same time he would be sufficiently well-trained to use the sword should an 
unusual situation on the battlefield make such tactics appropriate. 
 
Needless to say the cavalry officers disagreed ǁith ‘oďeƌts͛ deĐisioŶs. TheǇ 
understood the necessity to train the cavalry in the use of a rifle but they firmly 
believed in the virtue of the arme blanche.81 In their opinion the problem was not 
with their role or training but was the result of being equipped with a carbine.82 
Several cavalrymen claimed that having a weapon with a shorter barrel than the 
                                                     
76 See Anglesey, pp. 396-397. 
77 E. Spiers, 'The British Cavalry, 1902-1914', Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, LVI (1979), pp. 73-74. 
78 Anglesey., pp. 391-392; B. Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry, 
1870-1914' ed. M. Howard, The Theory and Practice of War (London, 1965), pp. 111-
112. 
79 Anglesey, p. 397. 
80 Spiers, pp. 71-9., pp. 71-72. During the Second Afghan War, Roberts observed how 
the cavalry could be rendered completely ineffectual if the troopers had been 
thrown from their horses whilst their carbines were in bucket on the saddle. 
81 ͚‘epoƌt oŶ the OƌgaŶisatioŶ aŶd EƋuipŵeŶt of CaǀalƌǇ͛, ϴth November 1901, WO 
32/6781, TNA. 
82 ͚‘epoƌt oŶ the OƌgaŶisatioŶ aŶd EƋuipŵeŶt of CaǀalƌǇ͛, ϴth November 1901, WO 
32/6781, TNA. 
 - 20 - 
ordinary rifle was iniquitous when confronting the Boer Mauser.83 Such a suggestion 
may have been a ploy by the Cavalry School to throw attention away from the man 
behind the weapon and onto the rifle itself. But in either case the complaint about 
the ĐaƌďiŶe thƌeǁ douďt oŶ ‘oďeƌts͛ aƌguŵeŶt that the ĐaǀalƌǇ had not dismounted 
often enough to make effective use of their secondary weapons.84 The fault was not 
with the cavalry itself but the poor choice of small arms that they had been forced to 
accept. 
 
When contextualised this way, it becomes apparent that the main reason why the 
Cavalry School were keen supporters of the SMLE was because they believed it 
would put them on an equal footing with the infantry should they be forced to 
dismount.85 The encumbrance of having a longer weapon than the carbine could be 
balanced against the advantage of having the same firepower capability as the 
infantry.86 With a wooden hand guard that covered the entire barrel, the new design 
of rifle not only protected the trooper from a hot barrel whilst he was firing but it 
also made it more comfortable when it was strapped to his back in the manner 
determined by Lord Roberts.87 Adopting the SMLE demonstrated that the cavalry 
were more than willing to embrace fire action in addition to their preferred modes 
of engaging with the enemy. 
 
Equally, however, it was important that the Mounted Infantry did not subsume the 
cavalry. In this respect, cavalry officers had to emphasise the tactical flexibility of the 
arme blanche as embodied by the ethos of the cavalry. The cavalry were uniquely 
able to undertake shock action, reconnaissance and flank protection. At the same 
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time they could also claim that a combination of their mobility and spirit enabled 
them to seize the moment and play a crucial role, either in the vanguard of a 
meeting engagement, or as an emergency stop-gap in defence.88 Embracing the 
SMLE was, therefore, a shrewd move in deflecting those critics who argued that the 
cavalry ought to be replaced by the Mounted Infantry or who claimed that firepower 
had made the place if the horse on the contemporary battlefield redundant. 
 
The SMLE sceptics 
Whereas the views of the Indians and Cavalry School were grounded in their 
experience of battle, what distinguishes this final group from the other factions was 
their sceptical views of the SMLE combined with their lack of battlefield experience. 
Made up of members of the NRA and doubting politicians such as Hugh Arnold 
Forster, the Secretary of State for War from 1903 until 1905, these actors 
questioned the need for a shorter-barrelled rifle and were ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ďǇ the AƌŵǇ͛s 
decision to abandon the LEME. As a non-governmental organisation closely 
connected to the military-political establishment, members of the NRA could use 
their contacts to help make a case for an alternative firearm. In combination with 
support from the Secretary of State for War this might have paid dividends. 
Surprisingly enough, however, not even the active intervention of Hugh Arnold 
Forster could upset a plan already set in motion by Lord Roberts. It seemed that the 
consensus that had formed between the Indians and the Cavalry School was too 
strong for this last group to challenge the decision to adopt the SMLE. This section 
explores the difficulties that these actors experienced whilst they went about trying 
to challenge military opinion. 
 
The NRA had been established in November 1859. Formed by members of the 
Volunteer Force, the ambition of the new association was to improve not only the 
shooting skills of the Volunteers but also of rifle shooters generally.89 By holding 
regular competitions the hope was to make shooting as popular as other British 
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sporting events. With the Prince Consort as Patron and the Duke of Cambridge 
offering an annual prize, the NRA had very close links with Royalty and the British 
militaƌǇ estaďlishŵeŶt fƌoŵ its iŶĐeptioŶ. EǀeŶ todaǇ the QueeŶ͛s Pƌize, oƌigiŶallǇ 
established by Queen Victoria, is still a major event during the Imperial Meeting at 
the N‘A͛s hoŵe at BisleǇ. 
 
With the appointment of Lord Roberts to the position of Vice-President of the 
Association in 1901 and the eventual death of the Duke of Cambridge in 1904, the 
NRA was extremely unlikely to make an official criticism of the decision to adopt the 
SMLE. Despite its official position the membership tended to have very particular 
views about rifles, views which surfaced in a number of newspapers and journals.90 
Wedded to hittiŶg ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal ďull͛s eǇe taƌgets at set distaŶĐes, the assoĐiatioŶ 
encouraged a view of marksmanship that was invariably at odds with the changing 
needs of the military.91 As faƌ as the N‘A͛s ŵeŵďeƌship ǁas ĐoŶĐeƌŶed the seƌǀiĐe 
rifle ought to be capable of accurately striking static targets out to long-range 
distances. Accordingly, members took a dim view of the SMLE because it did not fit 
with their ideas on marksmanship and rifle design. In particular they were not happy 
with the shortness of the rifle, the lack of a wind gauge for the rear sight and the 
suitability of cordite ammunition for target shooting. 
 
Similar views were being expressed by the Secretary of State for War who was 
uŶsuƌe of the shoƌteƌ ƌifle͛s ŵeƌits aŶd said as ŵuĐh to the Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ.92 For 
example, Arnold Forster asked the Director General of Ordnance (DGO), Sir Henry 
Brackenbury, for further information about the SMLE.93 Specifically he had questions 
in five key areas. The first was whether the decision to adopt the SMLE was subject 
to trial by an independent judge. The second related to whether other nations made 
                                                     
90 Foƌ ĐƌitiĐisŵ of the “MLE see, ͚Papeƌ CuttiŶgs, 1896-1905 – Small-arms and 
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91  ͚The Neǁ “eƌǀiĐe ‘ifle͛, The Times, 15th September 1903. 
92 Arnold Forster Papers, 50315, BL. 
93 The New Rifle – Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War and Replies by Sir 
Henry Brackenbury, Director GeŶeƌal of OƌdŶaŶĐe,͛ Ϯϵth April 1903, Arnold Forster 
Papers, 50315, BL. 
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use of the same weapon for both their cavalry and infantry. The third was concerned 
with finding positive evidence that the SMLE was better than the rifles of other 
nations. The fourth centred on how shortening the rifle by four inches affected the 
range of the SMLE when compared to the long LEME and the firearms of other 
nations. In his final question Arnold Forster asked whether longer ranges were no 
longer deemed necessary by the Army. 
 
GiǀeŶ that the “eĐƌetaƌǇ of “tate ǁould haǀe to defeŶd the AƌŵǇ͛s deĐisioŶ iŶ the 
House of Commons it might not appear that Arnold Forster was doing anything other 
than trying to make sure that he was sufficiently briefed. However, even after he had 
received an official response from the DGO outlining the main arguments in favour 
of the SMLE, the Secretary of State did not appear to be happy with the situation.94 
In 1905, for instance, after Brackenbury had been replaced by General Wolfe 
Murray, who at that time was Master General of Ordnance, Arnold Forster asked 
similar questions again. This time, however, the responses he elicited were not just 
the views of the MGO but also those of the Superintendent of the RSAF who re-
emphasised the points being made by Wolfe Murray. 
 
Clearly the Army was singularly unimpressed by the critics and was not prepared to 
compromise on the SMLE. In a review of the arguments being made by the Bisley 
set, Major Markur re-stated for the benefit of the Secretary of State the facts of the 
battlefield as understood by the Army.95 Fighting on the North West Frontier and in 
South Africa had demonstrated the need for a light, handy rifle that would be more 
than sufficient for the average infantryman. There was no need for a match rifle, 
͚…foƌ the use of eǆpeƌts ĐoŶtestiŶg aĐƌoss the gƌeeŶ eǆpaŶses of BisleǇ… [ďut iŶstead 
a ǁeapoŶ]… foƌ use ďǇ ĐoŵpaƌatiǀelǇ ĐluŵsǇ pƌaĐtitioners, whose operations 
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eǆteŶds fƌoŵ CaŶada to the Cape, aŶd fƌoŵ the AfghaŶ fƌoŶtieƌ to “iŶgapoƌe…͛.96 
Evidently the military members of the War Office, having returned from the war in 
South Africa, were not prepared to take lessons in rifle design from people who had 
not experienced the contemporary battlefield. 
 
On the face of it these issues do not appear to say much about why the SMLE took 
the foƌŵ that it did. Hoǁeǀeƌ, it Đould also ďe aƌgued that the “MLE sĐeptiĐs͛ failuƌe 
to make any changes to the way in which both battlefield problems and its technical 
solutions were perceived says much about the relative power of the Army compared 
to politicians, the press and other non-governmental actors at that time. Certain 
members of the NRA had a particular view of the battlefield skewed by their interest 
in target shooting. This resulted in a reasonable amount of press coverage, 
stimulating parliamentary questions and some consternation with the Secretary of 
State for War.97 However, in the aftermath of the Boer War it was difficult for the 
critics to get their voice heard or to challenge the decision already made by the 
Indians and Cavalry School. Consequently, the views of this final group could be 
marginalised by the strength of opinion within the Army, committed as it was to a 
handier, lighter weapon with increased rates of fire. What is more surprising is how 
the “eĐƌetaƌǇ of “tate ǁas uŶaďle to ĐhalleŶge the AƌŵǇ͛s deĐisioŶ ǁith ƌegaƌds to 
the SMLE even though he had support from outside the War Office. Reliant as he 
was on the advice given him by the Army itself, it was extremely hard for a politician 
to dispute the choices of the Army. 
 
Conclusion 
At first glance the SMLE looks like it is simply concerned with improving the initial 
design of the LEME. According to this line of reasoning, the SMLE represents the 
onward march of technical progress towards ever more destructive types of 
weaponry where fire action would dominate the future battlefield. Where this 
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interpretation falls down, however, is in relation to the contingent nature of events 
that shaped the “MLE͛s deǀelopŵeŶt. Without the Đollapse of the WolseleǇ ƌiŶg, foƌ 
eǆaŵple, it is ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ ŵoƌe likelǇ that the suggestioŶs ŵade ďǇ HaŵiltoŶ͛s ƌifle 
committee would have been rejected by a sceptical Commander-in-Chief. As it was, 
the ideas proposed by the committee received a warm reception from Lord Roberts, 
a man who was well-disposed to Hamilton and held similar views with regards to 
firepower and tactics. 
 
The SMLE was, therefore, a weapon that reflected the views of this newly dominant 
group of former Indian Army officers. Shaped as they were by their experiences on 
the North West Frontier, as far as Hamilton and Roberts were concerned it was 
important to adopt firearms with increased rates of fire and to find ways to 
encourage soldiers to use their rifles according to the demands of battle. The way in 
which this view manifested itself in the design of the SMLE related to removing 
those technical contrivances that hindered rapid fire. This meant designing a lighter 
and shorter rifle, making it easier to bring it to the shoulder for snap firing at moving 
targets. At the same time, if the enemy were unwilling to reveal their positions or 
were moving quickly, then faster reload times would make up for the increased 
chance of missing the target. Consequently, the SMLE gave troops the ability to 
generate fire more quickly and at a pace appropriate for a particular engagement. 
 
The collapse of the Wolseley ring did not, however, guarantee the cooperation of 
either the Cavalry School or the SMLE sceptics. Given the deteriorating post-Boer 
War relationship between the Indians and the Cavalry School, for example, the 
possibility that consensus would emerge with regards to what ought to replace the 
LEME was not guaranteed. After all, there was every possibility that a growing 
mutual distrust could prevent agreement from being reached on the SMLE. What 
becomes clear, however, is that the two groups could find common cause in the rifle 
question precisely because it underpinned the institutional survival of the cavalry 
and did not compel one side to accept the battlefield tactics of its rival. Thus the 
Indians might have been interested in increasing the rate of fire a soldier could 
generate but the cavalry were more concerned with demonstrating their continuing 
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relevance to warfare. Echoing the findings of Gervase Phillips and a number of other 
scholars, the cavalry were keen to find technologies that would enhance their utility 
on the battlefield in the light of inconclusive evidence about the effectiveness of 
firepower.98 In this respect the decision by the cavalry to accept a weapon used by 
the infantry was a way of maintaining their unique role on the battlefield. For both 
groups then, the SMLE was acceptable because it left open the tactical possibilities. 
 
Finally, the NRA and the sceptical politicians are an interesting aside to this story 
primarily because of their inability to affect the procurement process. Outside of 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt the “MLE͛s ĐƌitiĐs Đould only manage to voice their opinions through the 
press. This might have helped a Secretary of State who had concerns about the 
replacement for the LEME. Inside the War Office, however, the ability of the 
Secretary of State for War, was equally circumscribed. Dependent on information 
provided by his military advisors it was not possible, despite some concerns about 
the appropriateness of the SMLE, for the government to challenge the Army on its 
deĐisioŶ to ƌeplaĐe the LEME. No douďt ǁhat ďuttƌessed the AƌŵǇ͛s endeavours in 
this regard was the knowledge that sooner or later a new minister would come to 
power and their interests in the new rifle would not necessarily be the same as those 
of Arnold Forster. At the same time, the language used by the Army to define the 
tactical problem they faced could not easily be redefined by non-experts. As a result, 
the sceptics were increasingly locked into a form of debate that made it hard to 
escape the views of the Indians and the cavalry. When it came to technical matters 
the Army was the dominant actor while politicians were insufficiently powerful to 
affect design choices. 
 
If the SMLE had simply been the product of inevitable technological progress in 
engineering then the suggestions made by Colonel Lockyer would have been 
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aĐĐepted iŵŵediatelǇ.  That LoĐkǇeƌ͛s suggestioŶs ǁeƌe ƌejeĐted iŶ ϭϴϵϲ poiŶts to 
the fact that a number of contingent events shaped the selection of the weapon. 
Whereas the LEME was born out of a debate between those who held on to the idea 
of firing in volleys by rank and file and those who were more concerned about 
logistics and officer-man relations, the SMLE was the technological representation of 
change in the social attitudes of the Army. The weapon was designed to encourage 
the soldier to use his weapon independently of his officer. As such it relied on the 
good judgement of the man behind the rifle. However, this could only be acceptable 
if the right sort of man could be recruited or trained to use his weapon 
appropriately, a notion reflected in some of the more controversial perspectives of 
Ian Hamilton and his later flirtation with right-wing politics. Nonetheless, the British 
Army spent much of the decade before the First World War professionalising their 
marksmanship and weapon handling, a possibility that had been further encouraged 
with the selection of the SMLE, a rifle inspired by the fighting on the North West 
Frontier. 
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